STOREY 

RECOGNITION 
OF  PANAMA 


wfrM^ 

University  of  California  •  Berkeley 


THE    RECOGNITION    of  PANAMA 


DELIVERED   AT    MASSACHUSETTS   REFORM    CLUB 

5,   190) 


MOORFIEL1)   STOREY 

53- 


BOSTON 
Gio.  H.  FLU*  Co.  pMxrtRs,  s-i  CO*CRC*S  Srttrr 


S 


Gift 

WraW.A.  Croffut 
0    24     '0« 


THE  RECOGNITION  OF  PANAMA. 


In  order  to  discuss  intelligently  the  action  of  the  ad- 
ministration toward  the  Republic  of  Colombia,  it  is  necessary 
first  to  know  the  facts,  and  I  will  endeavor  to  state  these 
briefly. 

The  treaty  of  1846  between  the  United  States  and  New 
Granada,  in  the  words  of  Secretary  Hay,  "  is  not  dependent 
for  hs  efficacy  on  the  personnel  of  the  signers  or  the  name  of 
the  territory  it  affects,"  but  "  is  a  covenant,  as  the  lawyers 
say,  that  runs  with  the  land."  That  is,  it  binds  both  the 
United  States  and  the  Republic  of  Colombia,  which  has 
succeeded  to  the  rights  and  obligations  of  New  Granada. 

This  treaty  contained  the  following  reciprocal  agreements : 

"The  government  of  New  Granada  guarantees  to  the 
government  of  the  United  States  that  the  right  of  way  or 
transit  across  the  Isthmus  of  Panama  upon  any  modes  of 
communication  that  now  exist,  or  that  may  hereafter  be 
constructed,  shall  be  open  and  free  to  the  government  and 
citizens  of  the  United  States,"  and  "as  an  especial  com- 
pensation for  the  said  advantages  and  for  the  favors  they  have 
acquired  by  the  fourth,  fifth,  and  sixth  articles  of  this  treaty 
.the  United  States  guarantee  positively  and  efficaciously  to 
New  Granada  by  the  present  stipulation  the  perfect  neutrality 
of  the  before-mentioned  isthmus  with  the  view  that  the 
transit  from  one  sea  to  the  other  may  not  be  interrupted  or 
embarrassed  in  any  future  time  while  this  treaty  exists,  and 
in  consequence  the  United  States  also  guarantee  in  the  same 
manner  the  rights  of  sovereignty  and  property  which  New 
Granada  has  and  possesses  oi-er  tfie  said  territory.9* 

Construing  the  language  fairly,  New  Granada  warrants  to 
the  United  States  that  travel  across  the  isthmus  shall  not  be 
interrupted  and  the  United  States  warrants  to  New  Granada 


her  rights  of  sovereignty  and  property  over  the  isthmus. 
The  agreement  of  New  Granada  bound  her  to  prevent  any 
interference  by  her  citizens  with  travel  across  the  isthmus, 
and  the  agreement  of  the  United  States  bound  her  to  defend 
the  sovereignty  of  New  Granada.  If  cither  party  failed  to 
keep  its  engagement,  a  claim  for  damages  would  arise  in  favor 
of  the  other;  and  this  was  the  clear  understanding  of  the 
parties,  as  is  shown  by  this  provision  of  the  treaty. 

"If,  unfortunately,  any  of  the  articles  contained  in  this 
treaty  should  be  violated  or  infringed  in  any  way  whatever,  it 
is  expressly  stipulated  that  neither  of  the  two  contracting 
parties  shall  ordain  or  authorize  any  acts  of  reprisal,  nor  shall 
declare  war  against  the  other  on  complaints  of  injuries  or 
damages,  until  the  said  party  considering  itself  offended  shall 
have  laid  before  the  other  a  statement  of  such  injuries  or 
damages  verified  by  competent  proofs,  demanding  justice  and 
satisfaction,  and  the  same  shall  have  been  denied." 

New  Granada,  in  a  word,  agreed  to  protect  travellers  across 
the  isthmus  against  interference,  and  to  pay  damages  in  case 
she  failed.  It  was  clearly  her  duty,  and  therefore  her  right,  to 
use  all  force  necessary  for  the  purpose.  In  consideration  of 
this  the  United  States  agreed  to  help  New  Granada  and  not 
to  act  against  her.  It  is  impossible  to  torture  language  so  as 
to  find  in  the  treaty  any  right  on  our  part  to  prevent  her 
keeping  order  and  protecting  travel  on  her  own  territory, 
especially  in  the  face  of  our  "  positive "  and  "  efficacious " 
guaranty  of  her  sovereignty.  Such  language  cannot  mean, 
"If  any  of  your  subjects  revolt  and  so  seem  likely  to  inter- 
fere with  travel,  we,  the  United  States,  shall  have  the  right 
to  help  them  and  prevent  your  asserting  your  sovereign  rights 
against  them." 

This  construction  of  the  treaty  is  supported  by  the  lan- 
guage of  the  next  treaty  made  in  1857  which  was  a  conven- 
tion negotiated  for  the  purpose  of  adjusting  claims  made  by 
Americans  for  losses  caused  by  a  riot  at  Panama. 

The  first  article  of.  this  treaty  uses  this  language:  "All 
claims  on  the  part  of  ...  citizens  of  the  United  States  upon 


the  government  of  New  Granada,  .  .  .  and  especially  those  for 
damages  which  were  caused  by  the  riot  at  Panama  on  the  1 5th 
of  April,  1856,  for  which  the  said  government  of  New 
Granada  acknowledges  its  liability  arising  out  of  its  privilege 
and  obligation  to  preserve  peace  and  order  along  the  transit 
routed 

This  shows  where  the  duty  and  of  course  the  right  to  deal 
with  insurrection  was  then  thought  to  reside  by  so  aggressive 
an  American  as  Lewis  Cass,  then  Secretary  of  State. 

On  April  30,  1 866,  Secretary  Seward  wrote  to  our  minister 
at  Bogota :  "  The  United  States  desire  nothing  else,  nothing 
better,  and  nothing  more  in  regard  to  the  State  of  Colombia 
than  the  enjoyment  on  their  part  of  complete  and  absolute 
sovereignty  and  independence.  If  those  great  interests  shall 
ever  be  assailed  by  any  power  at  home  or  abroad,  the  United 
States  will  be  ready,  co-operating  with  the  Government  and 
their  ally,  to  maintain  and  defend  them." 

On  October  27,  1873,  Secretary  Fish  said  in  an  official 
despatch  to  Mr.  Keeler,  referring  to  the  provision  under 
discussion :  —  ^ 

"  This  engagement,  however,  has  never  been  acknowledged 
to  embrace  the  duty  of  protecting  the  road  across  it  from  the 
violence  of  local  factions.  Although  such  protection  was  of 
late  efficiently  given  by  the  force  under  the  command  of 
Admiral  Almy,  it  appears  to  have  been  granted  with  the  con- 
sent and  at  the  instance  of  the  local  authorities.  It  is,  how- 
ever, regarded  as  the  undoubted  duty  of  the  Colombian 
government  to  protect  the  road  against  attacks  from  local  in- 
surgents. The  discharge  of  this  duty  will  be  insisted  upon? 

Secretary  Bayard  thus  stated  our  position :  — 

"On  several  occasions  the  Government  of  the  United 
States,  at  the  instance  and  always  unth  the  assent  of  Colom- 
bia, has,  in  times  of  civil  tumult,  sent  its  armed  forces  to 
the  Isthmus  of  Panama  to  preserve  American  citizens  and 
property  along  the  transit  from  injuries  which  the  Govern- 
ment of  Colombia  might  at  the  time  be  unable  to  prevent. 
But,  in  taking  such  steps,  this  Government  has  alivays  recog- 


nized  the  sovereignty  and  obligation  of  Colombia  in  the  prem- 
ises%  and  has  never  acknowledged,  but,  on  the  contrary,  has 
cxfrcssly  disclaimed)  the  duty  of  protecting  the  tfansit  against 
domestic  disturbance" 

President  Cleveland  in  his  annual  message  of  December, 
1885,  sp<>kc  thus:  — 

"  Emergencies  growing  out  of  civil  war  in  the  United 
States  of  Colombia  demanded  of  the  government  at  the  be- 
ginning of  this  Administration  the  employment  of  armed  force 
to  fulfil  its  guarantees  under  the  thirty-fifth  article  of  the  treaty 
of  1846,  in  order  to  keep  the  transit  open  across  the  Isthmus 
of  Panama.  Desirous  of  exercising  only  the  powers  expressly 
reserved  to  us  by  the  treaty,  and  mindful  of  the  rights  of 
Colombia,  the  forces  sent  to  the  isthmus  were  instructed  to 
confine  their  action  to  •  positively  and  efficaciously '  preventing 
the  transit  and  its  accessories  from  being  'interrupted  or  em- 
barrassed/ The  execution  of  this  delicate  and  responsible 
task  necessarily  involved  police  control  where  the  local  au- 
thority was  temporarily  powerless,  but  ahvays  in  aid  of  the 
sovereignty  in  Colombia.  The  prompt  and  successful  fulfil- 
ment of  its  duty  by  this  government  was  highly~appreciat cd 
by  the  government  of  Colombia,  and  has  been  followed  by 
expressions  of  its  satisfaction.  .  .  .  The  restoration  of  peace  on 
the  isthmus  by  the  re-establishment  of  the  constituted  govern- 
ment there  being  accomplished,  the  forces  of  the  United 
States  were  withdrawn." 

While,  therefore,  we  had  once  or  twice  landed  troops  when 
there  were  riots  or  insurrections  on  the  isthmus,  we  had  done 
so  in  aid  of  the  sovereignty  of  Colombia,  sometimes  at  the 
request  of  her  authorities,  and  always  with  her  approval. 
We  had  insisted  that  upon  her  rested  the  duty  of  protecting 
the  transit  against  attacks  from  insurgents,  and  had  notified 
her  that.  *'  the  discharge  of  this  duty  will  be  insisted  upon." 
Our  interpretation  of  the  treaty  and  our  action  under  it  had 
been  in  accordance  with  the  clear  language  of  the  treaty. 
We  had  helped  Colombia  to  discharge  her  duty  and  to  assert 
her  sovereignty.  We  had  never  interfered  nor  claimed  the 
right  to  interfere  against  her. 


There  is  another  diplomatic  precedent  which  should  not 
be  forgotten  in  this  connection.  I  refer  to  the  famous 
Ostcnd  Manifesto.  In  1854  Messrs.  Buchanan,  Mason,  and 
Soule,  the  ministers  of  the  United  States  at  London,  Paris, 
and  Madrid,  met  at  Ostend  and  issued  a  joint  declaration 
advising  the  purchase  of  Cuba  by  the  United  States  for 
$  1 20,000,000,  and  proceeding :  — 

"If  Spain,  dead  to  the  voice  of  her  own  interest  and 
actuated  by  stubborn  pride  and  a  false  sense  of  honor,  should 
refuse  to  sell  Cuba  to  the  United  States,  then  the  question 
will  arise,  What  ought  to  be  the  course  of  the  United  States 
under  the  circumstances  ?  " 

They  answered  their  own  question  by  saying, — 

"  After  we  shall  have  offered  Spain  a  price  for  Cuba  far 
beyond  its  present  value,  and  this  shall  have  been  refused, .  .  . 
then  by  every  law,  human  and  divine,  we  shall  be  justified  in 
wresting  it  from  Spain,  if  we  have  the  power." 

This  immoral  declaration  was  justly  condemned  at  the 
time  and  by  none  more  distinctly  than  by  the  Republican 
party,  which  in  its  national  platform  in  1856  asserted  the  true 
doctrine  in  these  words :  — 

"  The  highwayman's  pica  that '  might  makes  right  *  embodied 
in  the  Ostend  circular  was  in  every  respect  unworthy  of 
American  diplomacy,  and  would  bring  shame  and  dishonor 
upon  any.  government  or  people  that  gave  it  their  sanction." 

We  have  also  a  statement  of  the  true  American  position 
from  President  Roosevelt,  who  in  his  message  to  Congress  in 
1902  said:  — 

44  No  independent  nation  in  America  need  have  the  slightest 
fear  of  aggression  from  the  United  States.  It  behooves  each 
one  to  maintain  order  within  its  own  borders  and  to  discharge 
its  just  obligations  to  foreigners.  When  this  is  done,  be  they 
strong  or  weak,  they  have  nothing  to  dread  from  outside  inter- 
ference." 

Surely  there  is  nothing  in  these  words  to  indicate  that  a 
nation  whose  sovereignty  we  had  expressly  guaranteed  was 
in  a  less  favorable  position  than  other  American  nations. 


8 

These  precedents  show  what  we  had  considered  our  obliga- 
tions to  Colombia  under  the  treaty  of  1846,  and  how  aggres- 
sion on  a  weak  power  was  regarded  by  the  Republican  party 
at  its  birth  and  by  its  present  official  chief,  while  we  may 
recall  the  peaceful  declaration  of  Secretary  Hay  that  our  con- 
duct to  other  nations  is  regulated  ••  by  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
and  the  Golden  Rule." 

Let  us  now  compare  these  avowed  principles  with  the 
recent  action  of  our  government.  Within  the  dominions  of 
Colombia  lies  the  half-finished  Panama  canal,  begun  under 
a  concession  from  that  government  to  a  French  company. 
This  concession  in  terms  provided  that  the  company  might 
transfer  it  to  another  company  or  individuals,  but  "  not  to  any 
foreign  nation  or  government."  This  was  a  reasonable  con- 
dition, as  no  nation  could  afford  to  admit  another  nation  into 
its  territory  as  the  owner  of  such  a  canal  without  a  very  dis- 
tinct understanding  as  to  the  respective  rights  of  each.  The 
French  company  became  involved,  and  finally  after  much  ne- 
gotiation the  United  States  agreed  to  buy  its  rights  for  $40,- 
000,000,  but  in  order  to  go  on  with  the  work  it  was  necessary 
to  reach  some  agreement  with  Colombia. 

Colombia  was  enjoying  from  the  trans-isthmian  railroad  an 
income  of  about  $600,000,  which  was  an  important  part  of 
her  revenues.  Her  two  cities  of  Panama  and  Colon  owe 
their  prosperity  to  the  fact  that  they  arc  the  termini  'of  steam* 
ship  lines,  where  goods  and  passengers  are  embarked  and  dis- 
embarked for  transit  from  ocean  to  ocean.  \Vhen  the  canal 
is  built,  the}*  become  way-stations  by  which  steamers  will  sail, 
taking  from  them  perhaps  some  snr»*31  supplies,  but  otherwise 
contributing  little  or  no  business  to  their  citizens.  Colombia, 
therefore,  had  a  right  to  some  compensation  for  the  loss 
which  she  would  probably  sustain  from  the  buflding  of  the 
canal,  and  it  was  vital  to  her  that  the  relations  between  her 
government  as  sovereign  over  the  territory,  and  the  United 
States  as  the  owner  of  the  canal,  should  be  defined  clearly 
and  satisfactorily.  A  great  power  is  a  dangerous  subject  of 
a  weaker  nation. 


The  Hay-Herran  treaty  was  an  attempt  to  reach  a  satisfac- 
tory agreement  on  all  these  points,  but  it  was  rejected  by  the 
Colombian  legislature,  as  our  Senate  rejected  the  Hay-Paunce- 
fote  treaty  and  the  many  other  treaties  which  are  buried  in 
that  "  graveyard  of  treaties."  A  conspicuous  case  was  the 
rejection  of  the  Johnson-Clarendon  treaty  for  the  settlement 
of  the  "  Alabama  "  claims,  which  was  given  but  a  scant  consid- 
eration because  we  could  not  present  such  large  claims  under 
it  as  we  thought  should  be  presented. 

The  Colombian  Senate  acted  strictly  within  its  rights,  and 
we  have  no  more  right  to  abuse  the  citizens  of  that  Republic 
or  their  representatives  because  they  did  so,  than  England 
had  to  abuse  us  for  endangering  the  peace  between  two 
great  nations  by  rejecting  the  Johnson-Clarendon  treaty,  or 
than  any  man  has  to  denounce  another  for  refusing  to  sell 
his  property  at  the  price  which  the  first  wishes  to  pay  for  it. 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  provisions  regulating  the  jurisdiction 
of  Colombia  over  the  canal  were  very  unsatisfactory.  It  is 
from  Harpers  Weekly  that  I  quote  the  following :  — 

"The  Hay-Herran  treaty  was  unsatisfactory  on  these 
grounds:  first,  the  lease  was. not  perpetual,  but  renewable  at 
long  intervals ;  secondly,  the  canal  zone  leased  was  too  nar- 
row; thirdly,  a  conflict  of  jurisdiction  within  the  canal  zone 
seemed  inevitable  by  reason  of  the  complexity  of  the  provi- 
sions of  the  convention." 

Is  it  necessary  to  assume  that  the  Colombians  were 
actuated  only  by  base  motives  in  refusing  to  admit  their  pow- 
erful and  not  too  careful  neighbor  into  their  territory  until 
this  complexity  was  removed?  When  a  supporter  of  the 
President's  policy  thus  describes  the  rejected  treaty,  it  is  safe 
to  infer  that  the  Senate  of  Colombia  could  give  good  reasons 
for  refusing  to  accept  it!  With  any  powerful  nation  we 
should  have  begun  fresh  negotiations;  but  Colombia  was 
weak,  and  a  different  course  suggested  itself  to  our  rulers. 

Let  me  state  it  in  the  words  which  President  Roosevelt 
intended  to  use  in  his  annual  message  to  Congress :  — 

**  It  seems  evident  that  in  a  matter  such  as  this  we  should 


10 

finally  decide  which  is  the  best  route  ;  and,  if  the  advantages 
of  this  route  over  any  other  possible  route  are  sufficiently 
marked,  we  should  then  give  notice  that  we  can  no  longer 
submit  to  trifling  or  insincere  dealing  op  the  part  of  those 
whom  the  accident  of  position  has  placet!  in  temporary  control 
of  the  ground  through  which  the  route  must  pass :  that,  if 
they  will  come  to  agreement  with  us  in  straightforward 
fashion,  we  shall,  in  return,  act  not  only  with  justice,  but  with 
generosity ;  and  that,  if  they  fail  to  come  to  such  agreement 
with  us,  we  must  forthwith  take  the  matter  into  our  own 
hands." 

Can  any  one  point  out  the  difference  between  this  doctrine 
and  that  of  the  Ostend  Manifesto  ?  There  our  right  to  seize 
Cuba,  if  Spain  refused  to  sell  it,  was  placed  upon  "  the  law 
of  self-preservation."  The  President  would  have  placed  our 
right  to  take  a  canal  zone  on  "  sufficiently  marked  advan- 
tages "  of  the  Panama  route  over  other  routes.  Spain's  prob- 
able refusal  to  sell  Cuba  was  attributed  to  "  stubborn  pride 
and  a  false  sense  of  honor."  Colombia's  rejection  of  our  offer 
was  to  be  treated  as  "trifling  or  insincere  dealing."  In  both 
cases  we  were  to  take  by  force  what  the  owner  refused  to  sell 
at  a  price  fixed  by  us,  which  in  our  own  opinion  was  just  and 
generous. 

While  the  administration  was  in  this  mood,  occurred  what 
Mr.  Hay  calls  "the  sudden  and  startling  events  which  have 
so  recently  attracted  the  attention  of  this  country  and  of  the 
world" 

His  account  of  these  events  may  be  quoted  from  his  state- 
ment to  the  country  made  on  November  7.  The  people  of 
Panama,  he  tells  us,  "went  to  work  with  that  talent  for 
prompt  and  secret  organization  to  which  there  is  no  parallel 
among  people  of  Northern  blood.  They  prepared  the  ma- 
chinery *of  revolution  in  advance,  and  suddenly  in  a  single  day 
without  the  firing  of  a  shot  —  with  the  exception  of  a  few 
shells  that  were  thrown  into  the  city  from  a  Colombian 
steamer  in  the  harbor  of  Panama  --  they  accomplished  then- 
independence.  A  government,  consisting  of  the  leading 


II 

citizens  of  the  State,  was  at  once  organized  and  proclaimed  to 
the  world.  A  part  of  the  Colombian  forces  joined  the  .revo- 
lution :  the  rest  returned  to  Colombia ;  and,  so  far  as  we  arc 
able  to  judge,  the  new  republic  begins  its  career  with  no 
organized  opposition  throughout  the  entire  extent  of  the 
Isthmus." 

There  is  no  word  in  all  this  to  indicate  that  this  revolution 
was  not  as  sudden  and  startling  to  him  as  to  the  country,  or 
that  the  success  of  the  revolution  was  in  any  way  due  to  the 
United  States. 

He  proceeds:  "The  course  of  the  President  in  this  con- 
junction was  marked  out  in  advance  by  our  principles  and 
precedents.  He  gave  orders  that  traffic  from  one  side  of  the 
Isthmus  to  the  other  should  be  kept  unimpeded  by  either 
party,  and  charged  our  officers  in  the  Isthmus  to  use  their  ut- 
most influence"  (and  "influence"  is  a  pleasant,  peaceful 
word)  "to  prevent  any  attack  by  one  of  the  contending  fac- 
tions upon  the  other  which  would  be  calculated  to  cause  a 
disturbance  of  traffic.  When  it  was  reported  to  him  that 
a  government  capable  of  maintaining  order  had  been  estab- 
lished and  was  working  without  opposition,  he  did  what  was 
always  done  under  such  circumstances.  He  directed  our 
representative  at  Panama,  as  soon  as  ho  was  certain  that  a 
government  cajxible  of  maintaining  the  public  peace  had  been 
established  by  the  consent  of  the  people,  that  he  was  to  enter 
into  official  relations  with  it.  He  also  directed  our  minister 
at  Bogota  to  inform  the  Colombian  Government  that  we  had 
entered  into  relations  with  the  new  provisional  Government  of 
Panama." 

\Ve  may  note,  in  passing,  that  our  representative  was  in- 
structed to  enter  into  relations  with  the  new  government 
when  he  became  satisfied  of  certain  things ;  but  the  adminis- 
tration did  not  wait  for  his  report  on  this  question,  and  imme- 
diately informed  the  government  of  Colombia  that  relations 
had  actually  been  established  with  the  new  State. 

Now  what  were  the  facts  ? 

The  insurrection  broke  out  late  in  the  evening  of  November  3. 


12 

^ 

On  June  9  Mr.  Hay  cabled  our  minister  at  Bogota:  "11 
Colombia  should  now  reject  the  treaty  or  unduly  delay  its 
ratification,  the  friendly  understanding  between  the  two  coun- 
tries would  be  so  seriously  compromised  that  action  might  be 
taken  by  the  Congress  next  winter  which  every  friend  of 
Colombia  would  regret." 

On  October  24  the  cruiser  "  Dixie  "  was  ordered  to  put  to 
sea  at  once  with  400  marines  in  addition  to  her  regular  crew, 
and  it  was  reported  that  she  was  sent  to  Guantanamo,  but  in 
fact  she  went  to  Colon. 

On  November  2  the  Navy  Department  cabled  to  the  com- 
mander of  the  "  Nashville  "  at  Colon :  — 

14  Maintain  free  and  uninterrupted  transit.  If  interruption 
threatened  by  armed  force,  occupy  the  line  of  railroad,  pre- 
vent landing  of  any  armed  force  with  hostile  intent,  either 
government  or  insurgent,  either  at  Colon,  Porto  Bello,  or 
other  points." 

The  same  orders  were  sent  to  the  commanders  of  the 
"  Boston  "  and  "  Dixie,"  while  to  Admiral  Glass  at  Acapulco 
was  sent  the  following :  — 

"  Proceed  with  all  possible  despatch  to  Panama.  Telegraph 
in  cipher  your  departure.  Maintain  free  and  uninterrupted 
transit.  If  interruption  is  threatened  by  armed  force,  occupy 
the  line.  Prevent  landing  of  any  armed  force,  either  govern- 
ment or  insurgent,  with  hostile  intent,  at  any  point  within  fifty 
miles  of  Panama.  If  doubtful  as  to  the  intent  of  any  armed 
force,  occupy  Ancon  Hill  strongly  with  artillery.  If  the 
'  Wyoming f  would  delay  4  Concord  '  or  *  Marblehead/  her  dis- 
position must  bo  left  to  your  discretion.  Government  force 
reported  approaching  the  isthmus  in  vessels.  Prevent  their 
landing,  if  in  your  judgment  landing  would  precipitate  a 
conflict." 

These  orders  were  given  to  a  force  which  had  been  gathered 
at  and  near  the  isthmus  before  any  insurrection  had  occurred. 

On  the  next  day,  November  3,  at  3.40  P.M.,  the  Assistant 
Secretary  of  State,  Mr.  Loomis,  sent  to  our  consul  at  Panama4 
this  despatch : — 


13 

"  Uprising  on  isthmus  reported.  Keep  department 
promptly  and  fully  informed." 

At  8.15  on  the  same  day  the  consul  replied:  "No  upris- 
ing yet.  Reported  will  be  to-night.  Situation  is  critical." 

About  an  hour  and  a  half  later  the  revolution  occurred,  and 
the  department  was  informed  of  the  "sudden  and  startling 
event "  for  which  the  government  had  made  such  complete 
preparations  in  advance. 

On  the  night  of  November  2,  1903,  Captain  Hubbard  of 
the  "  Nashville  "  reports  that  he  allowed  four  or  five  hundred 
Colombian  troops  to  land  at  Colon,  not  feeling  justified  in  pre- 
venting them  as  the  insurrection  had  not  broken  out,  though 
he  knew  it  was  imminent,  for  he  telegraphed  on  November  3 
to  the  Navy  Department,  "  It  is  possible  that  movement  may 
be  made  at  Panama  to-night  to  declare  independence."  At 
8. 20  P.M.  on  the  3d  the  landing  of  these  troops  was  reported 
to  the  State  Department.  At  8.45  P.M.  the  department  replied, 
"The  troops  which  landed  from  the  'Carthagena'  should  not 
proceed  to  Panama."  An  hour  later  came  the  first  news  of 
tfie  insurrection. 

The  Colombian  generals  in-eemmand  went  to  Panama  on 
November  3,  and  were  seized  when  the  revolution  began- 
"Except  to  a  few  people"  nothing  was  known  of  this  in 
Colon  till  the  morning  train  arrived  from  Panama  on  the  4th; 
but  on  the  3d  Captain  Hubbard  went  ashore,  and  learned 
what  had  happened  and  that  the  Colombian  generals  wanted 
their  troops  sent  across  to  Panama.  On  the  3d  Captain 
Hubbard  refused  to  allow  this,  and  early  on  the  4th  he  gave 
written  notice  that  they  could  not  leave.  On  the  afternoon 
of  the  4th  he  ordered  a  force  from  the  Nashville  ashore,  and 
took  possession  of  the  railroad  station,  so  that  the  Colombian 
troops  could  not  move,  The  Colombian  troops  withdrew  to  a 
hill  outside  while  their  colonel  sent  a  messenger  to  Panama, 
who  was  to  return  on  the  5th.  Hubbard  occupied  Colon  on 
the  fth,  and  the  Colombian  troops  were  confronted  by  our 
marines,  and  on  the  afternoon  of  the  5th,  reports  Captain 
Hubbard,  their  colonel  "was  finally  persuaded  to  embark 
. .  .  and  return  to  '  Carthagena.*  ** 


*  14 

Now  let  us  compare  the  language  of  Secretary  Hay: 
"  They  prepared  the  machinery  of  revolution  in  advance.  .  .  . 
They  accomplished  their  independence.  ...  A  part  of  the 
Colombian  forces  joined  the  revolution :  the  rest  returned  to 
Colombia, " 

The  machinery  of  revolution  was  on  board  our  gunboats. 
It  was  our  forces  that  accomplished  the  independence  of 
Panama.  \Ve  cannot  doubt  for  a  moment  that  Dr.  Manuel 
Amador  spoke  the  truth  when  he  said  in  the  Ittdcpendtnt  last 
week, — 

"  Of  course  we  expected  that  the  United  States  would  not 
let  the  Colombian  troops  attack  us." 

Who  gave  him  the  right  to  expect  this  ? 

What  is  the  government  now  called  "  the  new  republic  "  ? 
A  self-constituted  junta  of  three  men.  Who  is  their  repre- 
sentative in  Washington?  A  French  engineer  connected 
with  the  French  Canal  Company,  appointed  by  the  three. 
They  have  no  courts,  no  constitution,  no  frame  of  govern- 
ment, no  legislature,  no  evidence  of  popular  assent. 

"  So  far  as  we  are  able  to  judge,  the  new  republic,"  says 
Secretary  Hay,  "  begins  its  career  with  no  organized  opposi- 
tion throughout  the  entire  extent  of  the  isthmus." 

Why  ?  Because  the  United  States  withstood  the  forces  of 
the  government,  forbade  them  to  fire,  and  forced  them  to 
leave  the  isthmus.  The  organized  opposition  of  the  Colom- 
bian government  was  paralyzed  by  our  superior  force.  It 
takes  a  few  days  to  organize  a  new  opposition.  The  insur- 
rection began  on  the  night  of  the  3d.  Secretary  Hay's  state- 
ment was  issued  on  the  7th. 

That  opposition  exists,  and  the  reason  why  it  is  not  or- 
ganized may  be  gathered  from  the  news  brought  by  passengers 
on  the  "Alliance"  from  Colon  and  telegraphed  from  New 
York  on  December  i. 

"  It  was  denied  that  the  prisons  were  filled  with  political 
prisoners,  but  about  130  persons  in  all,  it  was  said,  were  de- 
ported for  showing  discontent.** 

A  government  of  three  men  have  already  banished  one 


15 

hundred  and  thirty  for  showing  discontent,  and  this  arbitrary 
junta  is  called  a  republic.  Surely,  these  men  do  not  feel  very 
secure  of  their  fellow-citizens,  or  they  could  afford  to  neglect 
a  few  malcontents.  With  the  forces  of  the  United  States 
behind  the  junta,  their  fellow-citizens,  cannot  resist  them  if 
they  would. 

On  the  5th  the  United  States  received  from  Panama  a 
formal  announcement,  signed  by  the  three  persons  calling 
themselves  a  junta,  that  the  Republic  of  Panama  was  es- 
tablished. 

On  the  6th  the  new  government  of  Panama  is  recognized. 
Thus  reads  the  despatch  of  that  date  to  our  minister  at 
tiogota :  — 

"  The  people  of  Panama,  having  by  an  apparently  unani- 
mous movement  dissolved  their  political  connection  with  the 
Republic  of  Colombia  and  resumed  their  independence,  and 
having  adopted  a  government  of  their  own,  republican  in 
form/' 

Since  when  was  a  self-elected  junta  of  three,  supported  by 
foreign  bayonets  against  their  lawful  rulers,  not  elected  by  the 
people,  and  with  absolute  power  unfettered  by  constitutional 
restraint,  a  government  "  republican  in  form "  ?  What  did 
our  government  know  as  to  the  sentiments  of  the  people  of 
Panama  in  less  than  two  days  after  this  junta  had  seized  the 
power  ? 

On  the  lyth  of  November  the  conmissioners  from  the 
j[unta  sent  to  negotiate  a  new  treaty  reached  this  country. 
The  treaty  was  ready  for  them  when  they  reached  Wash- 
ington; and  it  was  negotiated,  signed,  and  sealed  between 
lunch  and  dinner.  Its  first  article  is  as  follows:  — 

"The  United  States  guarantees  and  agrees  to  maintain  the 
independence  of  the  Republic  of  Panama." 

Its  second  article  cedes  to  the  United  States  a  strip  of  land 
across  the  isthmus. 

The  treaty  is  sent  to  the  junta  for  ratification.  The  ten 
million  dollars  which  Colombia  rejected  is  now  to  be  paid  to 
Panama,  and  on  December  2d  the  junta  ratifies  the  treat}*. 


i6 

All  this  has  been  done  against  the  protest  of  Colombia, 
prevented  by  the  forces  of  the  United  States  from  quelling 
the  revolt  at  once,  and  now  notified  that  the  United  States 
will  resist  any  attempt  by  it  to  assert  that  sovereignty  which 
the  United  States  by  solemn  treaty  agreed  ••  practically  and 
efficaciously  "  to  maintain. 

These  facts  are  undisputed.  They  appear  by  official  docu- 
ments. It  is  not  necessary  to  point  out  that  the  revolution 
was  hatched  in  New  York.  It  is  not  necessary  to  inquire 
whether  the  revolutionists  consulted  Mr.  Hay  in  September, 
informed  him  that  the  outbreak  was  "  scheduled  to  take  place 
on  September  23,"  and  were  ad  vised  to  postpone  it,  as  is 
stated  in  the  New  York  papers.  We  know  that  the  plan  was 
known  to  our  authorities  in  advance,  that  they  prepared  to 
aid  the  revolutionists  by  force,  that  they  did  so,  and  that  to 
their  interposition  the  success  of  the  revolution  is  due. 

It  is  clear  that  our  action  is  in  distinct  violation  of  our 
solemn  treaty.  Its  language  is  plain,  and  the  obvious  inter- 
pretation of  that  language  is  sustained  by  our  action  under 
previous  administrations. 

It  is  clear  that,  if  there  had  been  no  treaty,  our  action 
would  have  been  in  flagrant  violation  of  international  law. 
Our  mere  recognition  of  the  new  government  as  and  when 
was  made  was  unjustified. 

To  quote  three  authorities ;  John  Quincy  Adams  in  dealing 
with  the  question  of  recognizing  the  South  American  Re- 
publics said  to  President  Monroe :  "  There  is  a  stage  in  such 
contests  when  recognition  of  independence  may  be  granted 
without  departure  from  the  obligations  of  neutrality.  It  is 
the  stage  when  independence  is  established  as  a  matter  of  fact 
so  as  to  leave  the  chances  of  the  opposite  party  to  recover 
their  dominion  utterly  desperate/' 

Charles  Sumner,  in  an  elaborate  speech  on  the  action  of 
England  in  recognizing  the  Southern  Confederacy  as  a  bel- 
ligerent, after  a  careful  review  of  the  precedents,  said :  — 

"  The  conclusion,  then,  is  clear.  To  justify  recognition,  h 
must  appear  beyond  doubt  that  de  facto  the  contest  is 


and  that  df  facto  the  new  government  is  established  secure 
within  fixed  limits.  Thtse  are  conditions  precedent,  not  to  be 
avoided  without  open  offence  to  a  friendly  power,  and  open 
violation  of  that  International  Law  which  is  the  guardian  of 
the  world's  peace/' 

"Armed  recognition  is  simply  recognition  by  coercion.  It 
is  a  belligerent  act,  constituting  war,  and  can  be  vindicated 
only  as  war.  .  . .  But  an  attempt  under  guise  of  recognition  to 
coerce  the  dismemberment  or  partition  of  a  country  is  in  its 
nature  offensive  beyond  ordinary  war." 

In  his  message  of  April  n,  1898,  Mr.  McKinley,  seeking 
to  justify  his  refusal  to  recognize  the  independence  of  Cuba, 
said:  — 

"  They  arc  evidences  that  the  United  States,  in  addition  to 
the  test  imposed  by  public  law  as  the  condition  of  the  recog- 
nition of  independence  by  a  neutral  state  (to  wit,  that  the 
revolted  state  shall  •  constitute  in  fact  a  body  politic,  having 
a  government  in  substance  as  well  as  in  name,  possessed^  the 
elements  of  stability/  and  forming  dc  facto,  *  if  left  to  itself,  a 
state  among  the  nations  reasonably  capable  of  discharging  the 
duties  of  a  state '),  has  imposed  for  its  own  governance  in  deal- 
ing with  cases  like  these  the  further  condition  that  recogni- 
tion of  independent  statehood  is  NOT  DUE  TO  A  REVOLTED 

DEPENDENCY  UNTIL  THE  DANGER  OF  ITS  BEING  SUBJUGATED 
BY  THE  PARENT  STATE  HAS  ENTIRELY  PASSED  AWAY/' 

It  is  impossible  to  say  that  on  November  6  the  govern- 
ment of  Panama  was  such  a  government  as  Mr.  McKinley  de- 
scribed, or  that  the  danger  of  its  being  subjugated  by  Colombia 
had  passed  away,  when  Colombia  had  hardly  learned  that  an 
insurrection  had  occurred. 

Remember  our  denunciation  of  England's  action  during  the 
Civil  War.  Remember  our  repeated  refusals  to  recognize 
Cuba,  our  long  delay  in  recognizing  the  South  American  re- 
publics, our  action  toward  the  Transvaal  Republic  and  the 
Orange  Free  State,  our  denial  that  the  Philippine  Republic 
existed,  though  it  had  legislature,  courts,  schools,  and  the  de- 
voted support  of  a  whole  people,  and  then  tell  me  where  arc 


i8 

the  precedents  which  justify  the  administration's  course.  It 
is  a  gross  violation  of  international  law.  It  is  the  doctrine  of 
the  Ostend  Manifesto  adopted  and  put  in  force  by  the  gov- 
ernment of  the  United  States.  It  is  war. 

International  law  has  no  meaning,  if  it  does  not  bind  the 
strong  nation  in  its  dealings  with  the  weak, —  if  it  is  obeyed 
only  when  it  is  dangerous  to  disobey  it.  That  great  system  of 
jurisprudence  built  up  by  the  labors  of  enlightened  statesmen 
and  jurists  during  centuries  rests  ujxm  principles  of  eternal 
justice ;  and,  if  its  rules  can  be  set  aside  from  motives  of  in- 
terest or  ambition  whenever  a  great  people  or  its  rulers  for 
the  moment  desire,  there  is  no  international  law  save  "  the 
highwayman's  plea  that  •  might  makes  right.'  "  It  should  be 
the  highest  ambition  of  our  great  republic  to  be  a  leader 
among  the  peoples  in'scrupulous  regard  for  the  rights  of  the 
weak  rather  than  in  the  reckless  exercise  of  overwhelming 
.power  at  their  expense. 

But  we  wan*  the  canal.  That  is  true,  but  not  at  any  cost. 
We  want  many  good  things  in  this  world.  We  should  like  to 
see  property  more  equally  divided.  We  should  like  to  see  land 
held  by  men  who  would  use  it  'best  for  the  interests  of  all 
rather  than  by  the  shiftless  and  inefficient.  We  should  like 
to  see  criminals  promptly  punished.  We  should  like  to  sec 
men  who  have  plundered  their  neighbors  compelled  to  disgorge 
their  ill-gotten  gains.  We  should  like  to  see  corrupt  politicians 
driven  from  public  life.  But  we  do  not  believe  in*  securing 
these  good  things  by  lawless  violence.  We  wish  ours  to  be . 
"a  government  of  laws,  and- not  of  men."  We  believe  in 
courts,  not  in  irresponsible  despotism ;  and  we  refuse  to  let  the 
most  honest  reformer  redistribute  our  property  or  punish  our 
criminals  as  he  thinks  best.  The  crying  evil  of  the  time  is 
the  tendency  of  men  to  make  their  desires  the  standard  for 
other  men's  duties,  and  to  consider  their  wills  backed  by  their 
hands  a  substitute  for  law.  It  is  not  safe  to  let  a  strong 
man  decide  what  is  just  to  the  weak.  Such  a  doctrine  means 
anarchy.  Justice  is  the  same  for  individuals  and  nations,  and 
a  great  power  has  no  more  right  to  rob  a  weak  one  than  the 
prize-fighter  has  to  plunder  the  minister. 


The  course  of  the  administration  is  wrong  legally  and 
morally. 

It  violates  at  once  the  solemn  obligations  of  a  treaty  and 
the  well-settled  rules  of  international  law.  It  teaches  the 
weaker  republics  of  this  hemisphere  to  distrust  and  fear  us, 
and  to  adopt  perhaps  the  Mexican  proverb,  M  There  is  no  such 
wolf  as  the  shameless  Yankee."  It  tarnishes  the  fair  name 
of  this  country  among  the  nations  of  the  world.  It  estab- 
lishes a  precedent  which  is  sure  in  the  future  to  embarrass 
us.  It  sets  an  unhappy  example  of  lawlessness  to  our  citi- 
zens, already  too  prone  to  disregard  the  law  at  the  dictates  of 
passion  or  interest.  Far  worse  than  all  these  it  lowers  the 
moral  standard  of  our  whole  people,  since  many  just  and 
honest  men  struggle  to  apologize  for  action  which  their  con- 
sciences disapprove  and  which,  if  taken  by  Germany  or  Eng- 
land, they  would  indignantly  condemn,  either  because  they 
confound  their  country  with  the  politicians  who  represent 
it  and  believe  that  patriotism  compels  them  to  defend  what- 
ever these  politicians  do,  or  because  they  feel  bound  to  stand 
by  their  party,  right  or  wrong,  and  to  put  their  party  above 
their  count ry. 

Hear  the  voice  of  a  friendly  English  journal :  — 

"\Ye  regret  exceedingly  that  President  Roosevelt  has 
allowed  the  fair  name  of  his  Administration  to  besmirched  by 
a  transaction  so  utterly  at  variance  with  the  most  elementary 
principles  of  public  law  and  international  morality.  We  can- 
not conceive  a  more  lamentable  outrage  on  the  public  con- 
science of  the  civilized  world."  (London  Graphic?) 

If  you  prefer  American  testimony,  you  may  find  it  in  the 
history  of  Mr.  Rhodes,  where,  sj>eaking  of  the  Ostend  Mani- 
festo, he  said  its'  sentiments  were  "abhorrent  to  justice  and  at 
war  with  the  opinion  of  the  civilized  world." 

Emerson  has  well  stated  the  universal  law :  — 

"The  end  for  which  man  was  made  was  not  crime  in  any 
form ;  and  a  man  cannot  steal  without  incurring  the  penalties 
of  the  thief,  though  all  the  legislatures  vote  that  it  is  virtuous, 
and  though  there  be  a  general  conspiracy  among  scholars  and 


-o 

official  persons  to  hold  him  up,  and  to  say,  '  Nothing  is  good 
but  stealing/  " 

It  would  be  better  for  this  country,  for  its  teachers  and  its 
young  scholars,  if  we  had  tukcn  the  isthmus  by  open  force  than 
it  is  to  take  it  as  it  has  been  taken,  while  pretending  that  our 
course  is  justified  by  international  law  and  public  morals. 
Robbery  is  wrong,  but  it  lacks  the  clement  of  mean  hypocrisy 
which  attends  obtaining  goods  by  false  pretences.  Open 
robber)*  also  is  recognized  as  wrong,  and  is  condemned  ;  but,  if 
crime  is  concealed  by  sj>ecious  phrases,  it  g<>es  undetected. 
"The  world  is  still  deceived  by  ornament." 

It  is  not  patriotic  to  defend  such  action.  The  true 
patriot  must  desire  for  his  country  that  "righteousness" 
which  "  cxalteth  a  nation/'  May  he  not  jealously  guard  her 
honor,  and  treat  as  a  public  enemy  him  who  would  tarnish  it  ? 
It  is  by  such  acts  as  this  that  a  nation  loses  its  greatest 
strength,  the  strength  which  our  country  once  enjoyed,  and 
which  comes  from  the  respect  and  confidence  of  our  fellow- 
men.  \Ve  have  the  same  right  and  the  same  duty  that  the 
first  Republican  National  Convention  exercised  and  discharged 
when  it  declared  that  the  Ostend  Manifesto  "  was  in  every" 
respect  unworthy  of  American  diplomacy,  and  would  bring 
shame  and  dishonor  upon  any  government  or  jxx>ple  that  gave 
it  their  sanction." 

I-et  us  strive  to  save  our  country  from  such  shame  and  dis- 
honor now  by  vigorously  protesting  against  the  spoliation  of 
Colombia,  and  let  us  urge  our  countrymen  to  believe  that  a 
deserved  rqnitation  for  scrupulously  regarding  the  rights  of 
others  —  a  sincere  belief  in  justice  —  is  worth  more  than  all 
the  dollars  which  can  be  piled  upon  our  broad  territory. 


